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INTRODUCTION
In today's information-hungry society, the mass media is a powerful
industry that impacts the lives of most people.' Almost everyone is exposed
to the mass media on a daily basis by reading the newspaper, listening to
the radio, or watching television broadcasts. Routinely, the topics of public
debate reflect the issues that are addressed by the mass media through its
various outlets. When the ownership of media outlets is widely dispersed,
the range of new and distinctive ideas is increased. However, this range is
greatly restricted when media ownership is highly concentrated.
One problem that occurs with a highly concentrated mass media is that
journalists are no longer "watchdogs" for society. Historically, journalists
have investigated and exposed incidents of illegality in business. When the
media is highly concentrated, critics warn that it will not be able to continue
this effective "watchdog" role since the trail of some stories will often lead
to their own parent companies.
In addition, throughout American history, the media has played a
central role in the political arena. The majority of Americans turn to the
mass media for their political information and news, especially during an
election period. In the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections, traditional
outlets such as the newspapers and nightly news broadcasts covered each
of the candidates; however, the exposure for the candidates also included
such outlets as MTV and talk shows. When the media is highly concentrat-
ed, scholars warn that media executives will not look for innovations such
as this but will remain content with traditional coverage.2
Historically, as long as there have been media outlets, there have been
critics who have expressed a deep concern over the high concentration of
media ownership. An alarming trend towards greater concentration in mass
media includes several mergers that have taken place over the last several
years. In August 1995, Walt Disney Co. acquired Capital Cities/ABC Inc.,
completing the largest media merger in history. A month later, Time
Warner, Inc. announced its desire to acquire Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc., claiming the title of the largest media merger in history. Since the
announcements of these two mergers, critics have expressed concern about
both and are searching for a mechanism to stop the continuing trend
towards concentration.
1. In this Note, the term "mass media" includes such fields as print and broadcast
journalism, television network programming, cable channels and programming, the feature
film industry, and the music industry.
2. See Ben H. Bagdikian, Conquering Hearts and Minds: The Lords of the Global
Village, THE NATION, June 12, 1989, at 805.
[Vol. 49
MEDIA MERGERS
One possible solution is found in the antitrust statutes, which are in
place to promote competition and protect against attempts to monopolize
industries. However, under the antitrust doctrine of the past few decades,
analysis of media mergers would ignore social or political issues and focus
solely on economic concerns. Antitrust law, like other areas of economic
law, has always been heavily influenced by political views and consequent-
ly, often undergoes changes.' When political or economic views have
varied, changed, or simply developed over time, the antitrust doctrine of law
has changed as well. The changes in doctrine are not sharp swings from one
extreme to another, but rather are subtle, slow-moving changes that
eventually allow consideration of new ideas and concerns.
Several factors indicate that antitrust law is poised for a change that
will directly effect the recent wave of media mergers. This new doctrine
should not rely solely on economic concerns but rather should also take into
account both social and political issues. Part I of this Note examines the
history of media mergers in this country, including the terms and intentions
for the most recent combinations, and the fears that accompany mass media
concentration. Part II examines the legislative history of the antitrust laws
which supports the idea of taking into account social and political issues.
Part I examines the recent history of antitrust enforcement including the
"hands off" approach and acceptance of the Chicago School of economic
theory. Finally, Part IV acknowledges the history of change in antitrust
doctrine and proposes a few factors that will allow a new doctrine to be
accepted.
I. HISTORY OF MEDIA MERGERS
Over the last few years, mass media ownership became more
concentrated into the hands of a few at a rate that even surprised the
sharpest critics. Ben Bagdikian wrote The Media Monopoly in 1983, in
which he argued that fifty corporations control the mass media in Ameri-
ca.4 According to reports, another edition of Bagdikian's book will be
released this year and will conclude that now less than twenty corporations
control the mass media.' Bagdikian argues that media moguls are attempt-
ing to control the origination of content as well as delivery systems.6 "One
hundred years later, it's the Information Age that's displacing the Industrial
3. For example, the Reagan and Bush Administrations relied heavily on economic
theory and minimally applied the antitrust laws.
4. James Bock, Citizen Kane as Conglomerate; Media Concentration: Media Moguls
of the William Randolph Hearst Variety are Pass6., BAIT. SUN, Apr. 3, 1996, at A2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Revolution and you have the same thing happening with the airwaves and
cyberspace. You have the barons, whether it be Time Warner or Disney;
they're moving in to consolidate ownership," says Larry Grossman, former
president of NBC News.
The title of the "largest media merger" has changed hands over time
as the power of these media conglomerates continues to grow. In 1979, the
Gannett newspaper chain purchased a billboard and television company for
over $360 million In 1988, Walter Annenberg's Triangle Publications sold
to Rupert Murdoch TV Guide and other magazines for $3 billion.9 In 1989,
Time Inc. and Warner Communications Inc. merged and created a media
empire worth over $18 billion.'0 In 1995, Westinghouse Electric Corp.
showed that the major television networks were not beyond the reach of
media mergers by acquiring CBS Inc. for $5.4 billion." In addition to the
CBS deal, the two largest media mergers in history have taken place in the
last two years.
A. Walt Disney Co. Acquired Capital Cities/ABC Inc.
In August 1995, Michael Eisner and Tom Murphy announced the
largest media merger in history. 2 The $19 billion Disney-Capital Cit-
ies/ABC transaction was the second largest corporate merger of any type in
U.S. history. 3 This new media giant will have an annual revenue of $16.5
billion and a market value of nearly $40 billion. 4 It will control a large
portion of today's popular culture and entertainment assets including: the
nation's top-rated television network, ABC; the Disney theme parks; the
cable Disney Channel; ESPN; ESPN 2; ten local television stations, twenty-
one radio stations; movie production companies including Miramax,
Hollywood Pictures, Touchstone, and Disney; and a film library that
7. Alexandra Marks, Could Antitrust Cops Cuff Media Mergers?, CHRJSTAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1995, at 3.
8. Bagdikian, supra note 2, at 805.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Jessica Shaw, Deals: Mergers of Walt Disney Co. and Capital Cities/ABC,
Westinghouse Electronic Corp. and CBS Inc., ENT. WKLY., Aug. 11, 1995, at 13.
12. Johnnie L. Roberts, The Men Behind the Megadeals, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1995,
at 22. Eisner is an executive at Walt Disney, and Murphy is an executive at Capital
Cities/ABC.
13. Id.; See Don L. Boroughs, Dan McGraw & Kevin Whitelaw, Disney's All Smiles:
Michael Eisner Puts the Powerful Mack Kingdom on Top of Entertainment World with His
Blockbuster Purchase of ABC, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 14, 1995, at 32. The
merger is second only to the $25 billion deal between RJR Nabisco and Kholberg Kravis
Roberts.
14. Roberts, supra note 12, at 22.
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includes Snow White, Dumbo, The Lion King, and Toy Story.'
The philosophy behind the deal is synergy, which is taking the media
world by storm. The idea is that a media giant will be able to maximize
profits by creating products that take advantage of the interaction of its
assets. 6 For example, The Making of Pocahontas, a television special that
heightened anticipation of the film among the Disney Channel subscribers,
can now be beamed to nearly every household in America on ABC. With
the nation's largest television network now a part of its family, Disney has
the perfect forum to present its popular animated films and characters.
Disney's sense of synergy is well refined. What other company on
earth could have taken a children's movie, The Mighty Ducks, parlayed
it into a professional hockey team by the same name, broadcast games
on its own KCAL-TV and sold Mighty Duck jerseys in more than 400
of its own stores? 7
Judson Green, president of Walt Disney Attractions, says, "I think we wrote
the book on synergy" 1
8
Some experts do not share Disney's belief that synergy is a positive
thing for mass media. For example, the television networks realize that their
success depends on the ability to acquire and air the highest-quality shows.
With their new partnership, ABC can now be assured of getting first choice
of Disney's production studios. On the other hand, it will be equally as
difficult for an independent production company to outmaneuver a Disney
production when battling for a spot on ABC's network television plans.
Former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson believes that synergy is
actually the "annihilation of competition."' 9 Johnson says,
[W]hen you contract with an author to write a book and sell it in the
stores you own, produce the movie in the studio you own and run it in
the theaters you own, make it into a video and distribute it through the
stores you own, then put it on the cable system you own and the
broadcast stations you own, promote it on the TV network you own,
write it up in the entertainment magazine you own, that's pretty tough
to compete with. 2
B. lime Warner Inc. Acquired Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
In October 1996, Time Warner shareholders ratified the acquisition of
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. for $7.5 billion in stock, creating the
15. Id.
16. See Boroughs, supra note 13, at 33-34.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 34.
19. Bock, supra note 4, at A2.
20. Id.
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world's largest media empire." The combined company will generate
more annual sales--$18.7 billion last year-than the Disney-Capital Cities
combination.22 The assets include the following: HBO, Turner's Cable
News Network, WTBS, Turner Network Television, and The Cartoon
Network; a film library that includes classic films such as Casablanca; two
professional sports teams with the Atlanta Braves and Atlanta Hawks;
magazines that include People, Time, and Sports Illustrated; Warner
Brothers motion pictures studios and Warner Music.
23
The Time Warner/Turner combination is similar to the Disney deal in
that Time Warner's production studios will now have major cable networks
for distribution of their film libraries. In addition, Time Warner/Turner
executives also have extensive synergy plans. Recently, they launched the
CNN-Sports Illustrated channel on cable. They plan to have their magazine
reporters make appearances on CNN, and now Warner Bros. stores will
carry products featuring the characters from Turner's Cartoon Network.24
Howard Stringer, chief executive of Tele-TV, said, "It's a bigger empire
than Disney. You wonder why [the media moguls] don't start taking over
Third World countries." '25
C. What Is the Attraction for Mass Media to Merge?
First, several of the recent media mergers have created a relationship
between a production source and a distribution outlet. As explained above,
the executives of the large media conglomerates pleasantly refer to this as
"synergy" while critics warn that it eliminates competition. "One of the
reasons Disney wanted ABC was so that it could rerun its vast library of
movies and cartoons on network TV rather than on its lower-rated cable
channel. 26
Second, the new media mergers will enable the companies to
maximize copyrights. Integrated companies can reap profits by maximizing
copyrights. For example, Time Warner profits from its Batman franchise in
numerous ways. The 1995 hit movie Batman Forever earned more than
21. Thomas S. Mulligan, Company Town Turner-Time Warner Merger Approved by
Shareholder's Media: Management Says it Will Now Turn its Attention to Trimming Costs
and Raising Ratings and Subscriptions, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at DI.
22. Jeff Pelline, Time Warner Closes Deal For Turner Buyout: Would Create Largest
Media Company, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1995, at Al.
23. Id.
24. Comment: Big Media Mergers As New Competitors Appear, NEWs TRIB., Oct. 13,
1996, at SL2.
25. Pelline, supra note 22, at Al.
26. Warren Cohen & Jack Egan, Tomorrow's Media Today, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 47-48.
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$175 million worth of ticket sales, bringing the total for the three Batman
films to nearly $600 million.27 In addition to this box office success, Time
Warner owns DC Comics, which publishes Batman comics monthly, sells
Batman memorabilia in the 124 Warner Bros. stores worldwide, and
licenses the Batman characters for an unlimited range of products.2 8
Finally, the media mergers will allow companies to repackage existing
properties and create cross-promotions. For example, Ted Turner has
successfully concentrated on repackaging and promoting his assets. Turner
Broadcasting can show the same James Bond movies, packaged together
into seven nights of 007, and receive much higher viewer levels for his
cable channels.29 For an example of a cross-promotion, examine how
Viacom created an enormous anticipation for a movie in its exact target
audience. In 1995, after weeks of promotion and hype on its cable music
channel (MTV), the premiere for the film Clueless was held at the MTV
Malibu Beach House.30 Viacom simultaneously reached its target audience
for the film and created a production for its cable channel.
D. Fear of Media Concentration
The fear of media giants is by no means a recent discovery, but
actually dates back to the founders of the country and the age of the press
barons earlier in the century. In Thomas Jefferson's view, the power of a
large organization "oppresses the people," and dispersed power centers are
more desirable.3 Bagdikian argues that the power of media corporations
is an ominous development and concludes, "[b]ecause we have a dozen or
so huge conglomerates whose various arms can do damage or good for a
public person, they can boost a person, then harass them with intimidation
powers based on their control of so many parts of public communica-
tion. 32
One negative effect of large media companies is that it becomes very
difficult for an independent voice to get a message to the public. One
source noted that mass media is "a game in which only supergiants can
play,' 33 and these giants will not attempt to meet different tastes. 4 "They
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rita Koselka, Mergermania in Medialand, FORBES, Oct. 23, 1995, at 252, 254.
30. Id.
31. David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals In The Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 787, 810 (1989).
32. Claudia Puig & Brian Lowry, Star's 'Hard Copy' Stand Raises Hard Questions on
Conglomerates'Power, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1996, at C5.
33. Cynthia Flash, Microsoft, NBC Launch News Venture, NEWS TRm., July 14, 1996,
at Al.
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[media giants] are going to be able to determine what you see and what you
don't see. If someone says, 'I want to put on a community channel or a
state channel,' if one of these people doesn't like it, you'll never see it,"
said Jeffrey Chester, executive director of the Center for Media Educa-
tion." Law professor Louis B. Schwartz fears that concentrations of wealth
will dominate the government through control of the press, politics, and the
legal system.36
Another fear is that these large companies will be strictly driven by
profits and will begin to cut comers in news coverage. Reporting of local
and national news is what most consumers desire; however, covering local
events requires a large number of journalists and will be the first place that
executives look to lower costs. In fact, during the same press conference
that announced the approval of the Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting
merger, Ted Turner, new vice chairman of Time Warner, said, "[w]e're
going to cut millions of millions of dollars and, like Superman, we're going
up, up and away, in terms of ratings, magazine subscriptions, movie box-
office share."37 The company estimated that 1,000 jobs will be cut after
the merger. Independent media outlets consistently have proportionally more
journalists than their counterparts who are part of large media organizations.
A study showed that independent newspapers had 23% more local and
national news than papers owned by large media conglomerates. 8
As media companies grow larger, the likelihood that a story will lead
journalists to their employer's door increases. "One of the problems of
supergiants involved in the news is that supergiants always have other
interests that get into the news. The question is how they handle issues and
events in a way that ignore the fact that they control the news."39 Many
reporters will not feel comfortable covering a story in a manner that
portrays their parent company in a negative light for fear of retribution. A
survey by the American Society of Newspaper Editors found that 33% of
all editors said they would not feel free to print a story that damaged their
company.
40
34. Michelle Quinn, Media Mergers Raise Troubling Questions, SAN FRAN. CHfRON.,
Sept. 23, 1995, at Dl.
35. Id.
36. Barnes, supra note 31, at 814; See Louis B. Schwartz, The Mind of a Liberal Law
Professor: Selections from the Writings of Louis B. Schwartz, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 847, at
867 (1983).
37. Mulligan, supra note 21, at D1.
38. Maura Christopher, How Profits Shape News Companies and the News, ScHOLASTIC
UPDATE, Apr. 26, 1985, at 10.
39. Flash, supra note 33, at Al, (citing Bagdikian).
40. Christopher, supra note 38, at 10.
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Scholars suggest that a profit-driven news media will concentrate on
more "dumbed-down news and entertainment" rather than reporting and
investigating events.41 "They are all playing to get the audience ratings the
advertisers want. This is why the news covers fires murders, and mayhem,"
according to John Morton, a media analyst with Lynch, Jones & Ryan.42
Walter Cronkite, legendary anchor of CBS Evening News for eighteen
years, recently criticized CBS News for bumping important news stories and
relying on more entertaining ones.43
Industry experts believe that media mergers should be given special
scrutiny even though the industry is still more loosely owned than others,
such as auto or steel.' Benjamin Compaine, author of Who Owns the
Media, said, "[tihe difference between [the] media industry and the tin can
industry is that the media are the source of our ideas and information." '45
During the last few years, the Clinton Administration addressed the issue
of media concentration. "This is an issue that everybody in the Administra-
tion, from the Commerce Department and Justice Department to the Vice
President and President have all become concerned about," said Larry
Irving, assistant secretary of Commerce for Telecommunications.46
According to Irving, "[I]n a democracy, where the media is how people get
information, I don't think any of us want to see all of these outlets owned
by one or two people."47
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, chairman of the Senate Antitrust
Subcommittee, urged the government antitrust enforcers to investigate major
media mergers. In a letter to the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission, Metzenbaum said, "[C]onsumers could be
victimized by a handful of telecommunications conglomerates unless the
federal antitrust agencies focus and coordinate their efforts to provide rapid
and strict scrutiny of every proposed telecommunications deal. 48
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST STATUTES
Most Americans accept the economic and political power of big
business as a natural, inevitable feature of life in what they would
41. Comment, supra note 24, at SL2, (citing Bagdikian).
42. Christopher, supra note 38, at 10.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jube Shriver Jr., White House Weighs Moves to Slow Mergers, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1995, at Dl.
47. Id.
48. Metzenbaum Is Asking for Closer Scrutiny of Media Mergers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
1993, at Al.
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describe as a free society. We have trouble imagining desirable
alternative forms of economic organization because significant
restructuring is assumed to involve unacceptable public intrusion on
personal liberty.... Americans have not always shared this complacent
attitude or subscribed to the ideology that legitimated it. Instead,
Americans once believed that large concentrations of privately
controlled economic power were dangerous and viewed them with
suspicion and hostility.4 9
These fears were expressed by the opponents of the British monarch
and were the roots of this country's revolutionary heritage. The opposition
to monopoly power shaped political and economic theory until the last years
of the nineteenth century." These fears motivated Congress to pass the
antitrust statutes. Several judges have made claims that the antitrust laws
were passed to guarantee a balance on economic power in American
society. Judge Learned Hand stated, "[T]hroughout the history of these
statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with
each other."5 Chief Justice Warren claimed, "[W]e cannot fail to recog-
nize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing consider-
ations in favor of decentralization.""2 In addition, Justice Black stated,
"[F]rom this country's beginning there has been an abiding and widespread
fear of the evils which flow from monopoly--that is the concentration of
economic power in the hands of a few."53 Justice Black concluded that
Congress passed the Sherman Act to prevent further concentration and
preserve competition.54
"The antitrust laws are among the least precise statutes enacted by
Congress.""5 Several terms used in statutes are vague and difficult to
define, including: "competition," "unfair methods of competition,"
"conspiracy in restraint of trade," and "monopolize." "One commentator has
observed that antitrust legislation has, perhaps more than any other field,
49. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1219 (1988).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
53. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966).
54. Id.
55. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust. The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65, 81 (1982).
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stimulated the courts to consider, as an interpretive aid, the history of the
era that gave rise to the legislation."56
A. Sherman Act
The Sherman Act5 7 followed the Industrial Revolution and was
enacted in 1890.58 Millon claims that the Washington politicians of the day
reacted to the public's demand for a rebalancing of economic power by
passing a bill that would destroy the great "trusts" of the day.59
Pioneered in large measure by John Rockefeller, the trust established
a legally enforceable way for member corporations to unify control over the
product flows of each participant by fixing market shares and ensuring
profit margins." A group of leading producers in an industry formed a
trust by exchanging trust certificates for common stock in the different
corporations. The trusts exploited their customers and suppliers, which led
to the populist movement to pass legislation. At the height of their reign,
these trusts possessed the economic power to control the political process
and "exclude people from opportunities to seek material success in the
market."'" Eventually, the public organized themselves against the trusts
and called for the appropriate legislation. The principal supporters for the
Sherman Act were small business people and farmers.62
"[The Sherman Act] was concrete recognition of the public's interest
in controlling monopoly power, an interest that was not dependent for its
vindication on the initiative of private individuals injured directly by the
monopolist's conduct., 63 The legislative history of the Sherman Act is full
of examples of the fear that several Senators felt from the large trusts.
Senator Sherman, sponsor of the bill, equated the trusts' ultimate economic
power with political domination:
If the concentrated powers of this combination are intrusted to a single
man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of govern-
ment, and should be subject to the strong resistance of the State and
national authorities. If anything is wrong this is wrong. If we will not
56. Id.; See Rush H. Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L.
Rev. 215, 215-17 (1953).
57. Sherman Act, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
58. Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 563 (1986).
59. Millon, supra note 49, at 1223-24.
60. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 939 (1987).
61. Millon, supra note 49, at 1224.
62. Fox, supra note 58, at 563-64.
63. Millon, supra note 49, at 1281.
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endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over the
production, transportation, and sale of the necessaries of life. If we
would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat
of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any
commodity.4
Other senators concentrated on the moral illegitimacy of the trusts'
activities, including Senator Jones:
The growth of these commercial monsters called trusts in the last few
years has become appalling. For a long while they were limited in
numbers and applied to but a few articles, and while even then they
excited the detestation of good men, they did not exist in such numbers
and power as to cause apprehensions for the public safety. Now,
however, having been allowed to grow and fatten upon the public, their
success is an example of evil that has excited the greed and conscience-
less rapacity of commercial sharks until in schools they are to be found
now in every branch of trade, preying upon every industry, and by their
unholy combinations robbing their victims, the general public, in
defiance of every principle of law or morals.
65
Scholars such as Millon argue that the Act targeted the corporate
power that the free market inadequately controlled; therefore, the Act was
created to rectify the social and political problems of the day caused by the
power of large corporations.66 Under this view of the Sherman Act's
legislative history, it can justifiably be used to curb the increasing power of
the media giants in today's society because it is increasingly dependent on
the media's supply of information.
B. Clayton Act
In the Senate Judiciary Committee's report, the stated purpose of the
Clayton Act67 was to stop anticompetitive mergers in the early stages or
before they happened.68 "Section 7 of the Clayton Act prevents firms from
acquiring rival companies where 'the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.' 69
While Congress was substantially concerned with the economic effects of
mergers, it did not disregard the amount of political power that large
64. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
65. 20 CONG. REc. 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones concerning a proposed bill
related to the Sherman Act).
66. Lande, supra note 55, at 106.
67. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1994)).
68. Lande, supra note 55, at 128; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 264 F.
138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920), aff'd, 258 U.S. 451 (1921) (citing, Senate Judiciary Report).
69. Lande, supra note 55, at 127-28; Clayton Act § 18.
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companies could obtain through such mergers. 70 Representative J.P.
Morgan said:
[Ail1 of the power represented by this wealth is lodged in the hands of
a few men. Can anyone doubt the danger which such concentration
permits?... It is useless to say that the power represented will never
be used to the detriment of the American people .... It is too great a
power to be concentrated---it affords too great a temptation to frailhumanity.71
The House Committee Report expressed its concern stating, that "[t]he
concentration of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the
control and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has
grown to such an enormous extent that unless checked it will ultimately
threaten the perpetuity of our institutions." '72 The mass media is a very
powerful tool in today's society and the concentration of media in a few
hands raises the same power-related fears as expressed here.
Scholars that argue for a "multivalued approach" conclude that section
7 was intended to stop mergers that wil substantially reduce competition.73
However, the important distinction is that these scholars do not limit their
definition of "competition" to terms such as "prices, costs, and product
innovation," but believe that "competition" inherently includes "a strong
socio-political connotation."'74 Robert Pitofsky has stated that it would be
"bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws.",7' As a result, Pitofsky believes that
"despite the inconvenience, lack of predictability, and general mess
introduced into the economists' allegedly cohesive and tidy world of
exclusively micro-economic analysis, ' 76 any antitrust policy that fails to
consider such values "would be unresponsive to the will of Congress. 77
Another key part of the legislative history behind section 7 is that
Congress intended to restrict more mergers in any industry that is already
highly concentrated. 78 As exemplified by the recent Disney/ABC and Time
70. Lande, supra note 55, at 129. The economic concerns include the ability to control
prices and achieve large profits from the public. Id. at 128.
71. Lande, supra note 55, at 129; 51 CoNG. REc. 9186 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Helvering).
72. Lande, supra note 55, at 129; H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., at 19 (1914).
73. Wesley A. Carn, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic
'Objectivity': Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273, 280 (1985).
74. Id.
75. Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1979).
76. Id. at 1052.
77. Id.
78. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Decade Ahead: Some Predictions About Merger
Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 65, 71 (1988).
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Warner/Turner Broadcasting mergers, there is definitely a current trend
increasing the concentration of the mass media industry. This Congressional
intent, combined with the fact that the Clayton Act's legislative history
included social and political concerns, leaves the Clayton Act as a viable
option in curbing the large media mergers.
C. Celler-Kefauver Amendment
This amendment was the result of Congress' reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.79 In 1948, the
Court generously construed the language of section 7 of the Clayton Act
and protected the freedom to merge in certain situations. 0 The original
language of section 7 of the Clayton Act contained a legal loophole by only
preventing companies from purchasing the stock of rival companies. It did
not take long for companies to realize that they could effectively merge
with a competitor, and avoid the Clayton Act, by simply acquiring their
competitor's assets rather than their stock.8" In Columbia Steel, the Court
stated that such an asset acquisition was not a violation of the Clayton Act,
despite the fact that the end result was a merger that might lessen
competition. Congress responded by passing the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
merit82 to the Clayton Act so that the law applied equally to an asset
acquisition as it originally had to stock acquisitions."
In addition to the "loophole" motivation, many legislators expressed,
during the legislative history of the amendment, their fears of increasing
concentrations in certain industries. Members of Congress reiterated many
of the same negative effects of concentration that were originally expressed
when debating the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.84 Some warnings drew
analogies to the alarming consequences of concentration abroad. Senator
Kefauver, sponsor of the Amendment, stated:
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic control
in the hands of very few people is too clear to pass over easily. A point
is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this
79. Columbia, 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
80. Fox, supra note 58, at 565.
81. See Arrow-Hart Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v. Western
Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
82. Celler-Kefauver Amendment, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1994)).
83. Lande, supra note 55, at 130-31; Fox, supra note 58, at 565.
84. See the discussions above about the legislative history of the Sherman Act and
Clayton Act, supra at Parts II.A and II.B.
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country, where the public steps in to take over when concentration and
monopoly gain too much power. The taking over by the public through
its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two
political results. It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization
of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state.8 5
Scholars argue that these legislative goals should not be ignored today
in favor of "modem economic theory." 86 "However tempting, the legisla-
tive history cannot be invoked when convenient and disavowed when
problematic, for our antitrust laws represent the 'Magna Carta of free
enterprise,' guaranteeing to 'each and every business, no matter how small,'
the freedom to compete."8 Pitofsky fears that the increasing trend toward
mergers could continue until the major industries are controlled by a small
number of mega-companies' 8 "That kind of concentration would have a
profound effect on political power and the quality of life in this country.
Surely Congress did not intend such results when it amended section 7 of
the Clayton Act in 1950.""s
HLI. RECENT HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT
The application of the antitrust statutes has varied greatly throughout
the past few decades. In the 1960s, federal officials applied the antitrust
laws aggressively and were "hostile to mergers."" Robert Pitofsky
concludes that the "[m]erger policies pursued by the Supreme Court, the
Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission during the 1960s
were, by standards widely embraced today, excessively restrictive."'" In
the 1970s, the federal officials loosened the tight reins they had held on
merger activities.92 Pitofsky argues that the "relaxed" enforcement was the
result of the fact that large companies were feeling the pressure to increase
efficiency because foreign competitors were extremely efficient and
enjoying increased success in the American market.9"
When the industries that employ members of the society begin to
85. Lande, supra note 55, at 138; 96 CONG. REc. 16,452 (1950) (remarks of Sen.
Kefauver).
86. Cann, supra note 73, at 280.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1987).
89. Id. at 832 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 819.
91. Pitofsky, supra note 78, at 65. See e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
93. Pitofsky, supra note 88, at 822.
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suffer economically, the political pressure grows to aid American business-
es.94 This political pressure can have a direct impact on the administration
of the antitrust laws. The public outcry for assistance for American
businesses was enthusiastically answered by 1980 Republican presidential
candidate Ronald Reagan, who campaigned on the pledge to "reduce the
government's role in business."
95
At a meeting of the Antitrust Policy Institute, it was the consensus that
the Reagan and Bush administrations had "minimalized" the antitrust
laws.96 Reagan delivered upon his campaign promises by instituting
economic policies directed by Chicago School economists and laissez-faire
capitalists.97 "Free market law-and-economics scholars provided the
theoretical underpinning for the policy of an Administration that promised
business to get government 'off its back."'98
The antitrust policy of the Reagan administration resulted in "an
unprecedented increase in corporate mergers coupled with a dramatic
decrease in enforcement activity."99 A look into the numbers shows that
Reagan clearly intended to take government officials out of the business of
antitrust enforcement. When Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. corporate
mergers for the year totaled $33 billion.' After six years under Reagan's
economic policies, U.S. corporate mergers for 1986 totaled $190 bil-
lion. '0 In 1980, federal officials received 824 premerger transaction
reports.'0 2 This number increased nearly 300 percent when 2406 pre-
merger reports were filed in 1986.103 The Reagan administration's answer
to this increase in merger activity was to decrease the federal government's
antitrust law enforcement activities. In the years prior to Reagan taking
94. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 944-45.
95. Id.
96. Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky, Papers Presented at the Airlie House Conference
on the Antitrust Alternative-Introduction, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931, 931 (1987);
In 1986 Ralph Nader and Frederick Furth called together a group of scholars,
practicing lawyers, state enforcers, and policy makers interested in antitrust, the
consumer, and the competitive economy. The group that was convened was a
diverse group that shared the perception that the antitrust laws are being seriously
underenforced by the federal government and that the underenforcement has
reached a near crisis point, threatening the American competition system. The
group became known as the Antitrust Policy Institute.
Id. at 931.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Pitofsky, supra note 78, at 66.
100. Id.; See Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1305, at 451-52 (Mar. 5, 1987).
101. Pitofsky, supra note 78, at 66.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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office, government officials initiated enforcement actions against 2.5 percent
of reported mergers.' In contrast, government officials from the Reagan
administration only initiated actions against 0.7 percent of reported mergers
in the years 1982-86. l0s
Some scholars argue that the Reagan administration not only was
merger-friendly but actually intended to "revolutionize antitrust." 10 6 The
Administration's doctrine was based largely on the basic ideas of Chicago
School economic theory, and its belief in the ability of a free market to self-
regulate. The Chicago School of economic theory rests on the premises that
preventing inefficient activity should be the only goal of all economically-
related law, and that the market punishes inefficiency faster and better than
the law."7 "The Chicago beliefs are compatible with only the most
minimal law. In antitrust, the most minimal law, given the existence of the
statutes, is law that proscribes only clear cartel agreements and mergers that
would create a monopoly in a market. that included all perceptible potential
competition."' '
The Chicago School argues that efficiency should be the only goal of
the Sherman Act." 9 Robert H. Bork argues that there is "not a scintilla
of support" in the Sherman Act's legislative history for "broad social,
political, and ethical mandates.""0 The argument is that political and
social factors confuse and distort antitrust decisions and are irrelevant and
harmful to the analysis."' The Chicago School presumes that markets
operate most efficiently when left alone and that antitrust enforcement
interferes with that process."2
Some scholars see the United States v. General Dynamics Corp."3
decision as the initial step that the Supreme Court took in which it
embraced an economically-based approach to mergers." 4 Since this
decision, the courts have continued to rely on the examination of the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 947.
107. Id. at 957.
108. Id. at 958.
109. Jayma M. Meyer, Relaxation of the Per Se Mantra in the Vertical Price Fixing
Arena, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 73, 86 (1994).
110. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 10 (1966).
111. Meyer, supra note 109, at 86.
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696
(1986).
113. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
114. Cann, supra note 73, at 286.
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"realities" of particular markets in antitrust litigation." 5 A sure sign of
courts' reliance on economic theory is the fact that the use of an economist
in an antitrust case is seen as a necessity today."6 According to Stephen
E. Nagin, "Economic expertise lends itself to evaluating the potential bases
for claims, designing and analyzing discovery, providing a focus on the
important issues, preparing exhibits for trial, calculating damages, testifying
at trial, and if necessary, assisting on appeal.""' 7 The combination of the
Reagan administration and the Supreme Court's embrace of a purely
economic antitrust analysis has left little room for any social or political
concerns to be heard.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW IS A CONSTANTLY CHANGING BODY OF
LAW
Antitrust, like other aspects of economic law, has always been
influenced by cohesive as well as ad hoc economic and political
theories. Because views have varied, changed, and developed over time,
antitrust is infused with tension. It is out of such tension that traditional
antitrust law has grown and developed, enriched by insights of both its
critics and supporters." 8
The developmental process is not one of sharp swings from one
extreme view to another. Change begins when federal officials promote a
new theory of antitrust law by deciding which proposed mergers to
examine. The next step is case-by-case adaptation to the new ideas, new
situations, and new doctrinal theories.
According to scholar Herbert Hovenkamp, "If one hundred years of
federal antitrust policy have taught us anything, it is that antitrust is both
political and cyclical. Almost every political generation has abandoned the
policy of its predecessors in favor of something new....9 The antitrust
doctrines have evolved from the common law school, 20 through the rule
of reason school,' and the liberal school.12 The evolution has contin-
ued through the law and economics, or Chicago School, theory that has
115. See e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v.
Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
116. Stephen E. Nagin, Selection, Use, and Pay of an Economist in an Antitrust Case,
35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 255, 255-56.
117. Id. at 259. The cost for an antitrust economist can range from as little as $300, for
a recent graduate, to $2500 for a renowned expert who is a courtroom veteran. Id.
118. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 936.
119. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 214.
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dominated recent antitrust policy.'23 Hovenkamp has compared the
changes in antitrust policy to the common scientific model.
24
Initially, the new antitrust theory will only be supported by the few
who propose it, and these supporters will be called frauds by those in the
accepted school. 5 Next, a court will discount the accepted model and,
ultimately, accept the new proposed theory. Eventually, the new model will
gain more acceptance, and scholars will conduct the research needed to
authenticate the new model. 26 Hovenkamp concludes that the Chicago
School of economic theory will ultimately be replaced as the basis for
antitrust enforcement.'27 "Today the cutting edge of antitrust scholarship
is coming, not from the protagonists of the Chicago School, but rather from
its critics .... [T]he Chicago School, just as its predecessors, is mor-
tal."'128
A. Faults of Chicago School
There is no denying that the Chicago School of economics has dictated
the recent history of antitrust law. Under a new theory, courts will not
completely eliminate economics from antitrust analysis; however, economics
will no longer be the sole rationale or justification for decisions. Hoven-
kamp believes that the Chicago School's approach has two major flaws. 29
First, the Chicago School's approach dictates that antitrust analysis be
restricted to arguments regarding efficiency. 3 Hovenkamp argues that
this belief "overstates the ability of the policymaker to apply such a model
to real world affairs and understates the complexity of the process." '
Second, an efficiency model cannot accurately foresee a business's conduct
or actions. 3
2
Scholar Jean Wegman Bums believes that the Chicago School theory
is flawed because it does not consider certain issues that society deems
123. Id. at 215; See also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
124. Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 215.
125. See id.; See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); Posner notes that the early Chicago School theories were
regarded by outsiders as a "lunatic fringe." Posner, supra note 123, at 931.
126. See Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 215.
127. Id. at 216.
128. Id. at 216-17.
129. Id. at 283-84.
130. Id. at 284.
131. Id.
132. Id. In some industries, the theory has not accurately identified certain forms of
"strategic behavior." Id.
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important, and consumers do not believe in its application.'33 Bums
argues that this disbelief indicates that the Chicago School theory will be
replaced because "[n]o theory... will long survive if [it] is not believed
and does not suit society's needs."' 34 Bums concludes, "The time has now
come to move away from theory and consider the real world and societal
needs."' 35
B. Recent Court Decisions Have Expressed Distrust with the
Chicago School of Economic Theory
As explained above, the Chicago School of economic theory was
widely accepted and relied upon by the Reagan and Bush Administrations
in their antitrust policies. In addition, the Supreme Court gave credence to
the power an economic theory can have in antitrust analysis. In Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,3 6 several American
companies in the consumer electronics market alleged that their Japanese
competitors were involved in a conspiracy to price them out of the market.
The Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because
the plaintiffs' theory of "predatory pricing" made no practical sense.'37
This decision seemed to solidify the fact that the Court was comfortable
relying on economically based arguments in the antitrust arena.
Scholars were surprised by the seeming "about-face" that the Supreme
Court did in its decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.3 In Eastman Kodak, a group of independent service
organizations alleged that Eastman Kodak violated the antitrust laws
through the use of its tying arrangement between sale and service of its
products.'39 The Court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and, more importantly, expressed its doubt about the ability of an
economic theory to predict reality.40 The Court explained its opinion in
133. Jean Wegman Bums, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 600 (1993).
134. Id. at 602.
135. Id. at 651.
136. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574.
137. Id. at 588, 593, 595, 597. Predatory pricing is a strategic behavior in which a
producer would price their products well below cost over an extended period of time. The
rationale is that by doing so the producer will eventually drive his competitors out of the
market. By definition, a producer engaging in predatory pricing will sustain losses for a
period of time in return for the ability to control the market in the future.
138. Bums, supra note 133, at 636-37; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451.
139. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451.
140. Bums, supra note 133, at 637. Kodak based its motion for summary judgment on
basic economic efficiency arguments. Kodak argued that since there is competition in the
interbrand original equipment market, any restraint it places on its replacement parts and
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Matsushita and held that it did not create a right to summary judgment for
a defendant simply because it articulates an economic theory that supports
its behavior. 4' The Court held that "Ilegal presumptions that rest on
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally
disfavored."' 42 "In sum, the majority characterized Kodak's argument as
'mere conjecture' and questioned 'why the Court should accept.., theory
on faith rather than requiring the usual evidence needed to win a summary
judgment motion.""' 43
It should be noted that the Kodak decision was not a merger case;
however, it is directly related to the trend of media mergers in that it shows
the Supreme Court's willingness to criticize the Chicago School of
economic theory.'" This theory was the foundation for the "minimalist"
approach to antitrust jurisprudence in the 1980s, and the first step towards
a new approach in merger analysis is the acceptance of the weaknesses of
the present doctrine. In addition, it shows that the Court may be open to re-
address the social and political roots of antitrust law. Scholar Michael S.
Jacobs believes that "[tihough camouflaged by its distinctly economic
coloration, the Kodak decision turned on the acceptance of assumptions that
are essentially political in nature."' 45
C. Robert Pitofsky Is In a Position to Influence a New Doctrine
Section 7 of the Clayton Act governs corporate mergers and
acquisitions. 46 Section 11 of Clayton Act grants the Federal Trade
services is "irrelevant" because consumers will weigh this in their decision to buy Kodak
original equipment and refuse to purchase from Kodak if the parts and services are too high.
Id. at 638. Kodak asserted that a tying arrangement that raised prices too much would
eventually hurt their original equipment sales and thus be inefficient. For this reason Kodak
argued that the plaintiffs' theory was without economic justification and should be dismissed.
Id.
141. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468.
142. Id. at 466.
143. Bums, supra note 133, at 638 (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 480-81 n.29).
144. In Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y.
1994), a district court relied on the language from Eastman Kodak that questioned a total
reliance on economic theory. In Bon-Ton, a department store owner successfully received
an injunction to enjoin a rival's acquisition of another department store. According to the
district court, the preliminary injunction was warranted because the acquisition would
significantly increase the concentration of an already highly concentrated market. Id. at 860-
61. "Hypothetical formulas and paradigms are less important in this sphere than concrete
economic realities." Id. at 869. This is another example that courts are today less likely to
blindly follow an economic theory in an antitrust jurisprudence.
145. Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations ofAntitrust Economics,
74 N.C.L. REv. 219, 264 (1995).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
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Commission (FTC) authority to enforce Section 7.147 The Chairman of the
FTC is a key figure in the administration of an antitrust policy. On April 6,
1995, the Senate confirmed Robert Pitofsky's nomination as Chairman of
the FTC. 4 An author of numerous articles on antitrust, Pitofsky routinely
criticized the lax antitrust enforcement by the FTC and Justice Department
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. 49 In fact, Pitofsky has
concluded that "[t]oo many close calls went in the direction of inac-
tion."'5 ° He also stated that the FTC during his seven-year term will be
willing to bring the close case, where the past administrations backed
away.'
5
'
According to Pitofsky, the FTC should conduct investigative hearings
to examine whether the antitrust laws have failed to keep pace with global
competition and technological innovation. "The question that I think the
FTC ought to address is not what the law is, but what it ought to be," he
said.' 52 In his scholarly writings, Pitofsky supported the idea that the
antitrust laws should be used to protect the "marketplace of ideas.' 53
Anne Bingaman, the assistant attorney general for antitrust, agreed to allow
Pitofsky and the FTC to review the Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting
merger. By fighting for the right to review this enormous media merger,
Pitofsky showed that he believes that the antitrust laws can be used to
regulate the trend of media mergers. These type of mergers deserve a
heightened inquiry because of the media's important role in today's
marketplace of ideas.
Pitofsky said, "We always take an especially close look at mergers in
an industry where there's a very pronounced trend toward concentration
[and] media mergers looks to be quite a pronounced trend."' "M According
to Pitofsky, it seems likely that a case dealing with the trend toward media
mergers will eventually surface. "Before this merger surge is over," Pitofsky
said in a recent interview, "one of these cases is going to go to court, and
these questions will be raised."'55 He also announced that media mergers
147. Id. at § 21.
148. Dominic Bencivenga, FTC Chairman Pitofsky Seen As Tough Enforcer, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 13, 1995, at 1.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Karen Donovan, Move Over, Ms. Bingaman; New Trustbusterls In D.C., NAT'L L.J.,
April 24, 1995, at BI.
153. Bryan Gruley, Pitofsky Will Test Marketplace of Ideas Theory In FTC s Review of
Time Warner-Turner Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A14.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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deserve tougher scrutiny than mergers in a different industry. "You might
take a tougher stance... in the media field because you are concerned that
too much power in too few hands will impair freedom of expression."' 56
In his law review article, The Political Content of Antitrust,15 7
Pitofsky states his views on the importance of including social and political
values in antitrust application. "It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to
exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws."'58 In
addition, "[A]n antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns into
account would be unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch
with the rough political consensus that has supported antitrust enforcement
for almost a century."' 9 According to Pitofsky, the Sherman Act should
be used to control a group that attempts to control the media in Ameri-
ca. 6 On the other hand, Pitofsky does stress that noneconomic concerns
should not be the sole rationale for an antitrust analysis.16' The Chicago
School model is fatally flawed because it is only concerned with the ideas
of economic efficiency, but Pitofsky does not propose to replace it with a
theory that is as equally single-minded. The proper model for antitrust
analysis would contain a balance between economic and social/political
concerns. "Political concerns ought to be treated as limited factors that
influence the way in which prospective rules are designed to accomplish
antitrust objectives."' 62
Last summer the FTC staff, led by Pitofsky, conducted an intense
review of the Time Warner/Turner merger. 6 Pitofsky said this merger
was "one of the biggest and most complicated deals that antitrust officials
have reviewed."' ' 4 In the end, the FTC signed a consent order with Time
Warner/Turner that permitted the merger to continue. 6 The consent order
required TCI to put its Time Warner shares in a separately owned
156. Id.
157. Pitofsky, supra note 75, at 1051. Pitofsky recommends that those who ask about
his ideas on media mergers should read this article.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1052.
160. See id. at 1054.
161. Id. at 1057.
162. Id. at 1067.
163. Bryan Gruley & Ben Shapiro, Time, FTC StaffAgree on Turner Deal, WALL ST. J.,
July 18, 1996, at A3.
164. Time Warner Clears Hurdle for Turner, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 13, 1996 [hereinafter
Time].
165. Charles Haddad, Assembling a $20 Billion Company Merger Details: Winning
Regulatory Acceptance Was a Yearlong Project for Turner and Time Warner, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 13, 1996, at Bl.
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company."6 Without this requirement, Time Warner/Turner would have
combined the largest, TCI, and the second-largest, Time Warner, cable
operators in the United States.'67 Together, TCI and Time Warner would
have controlled 40% of the cable market.'68 According to Pitofsky,
preventing this result was essential to "preserve competition and protect
consumers.
' 169
In a recent article, Holman W. Jenkins Jr. criticized Pitofsky's intense
review of the Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting merger. 7 According to
Jenkins, Pitofsky "must now bristle and sound important as he waves
through the [merger] after preaching against antidemocratic evils of such
mergers when he was merely a law professor."' 7' Jenkins claims that the
FTC is arbitrarily distributing its favor to this or that competitor. "The
antitrust tradition once had intellectual pretensions, but today it's driven by
agency staff throwing their weight around on behalf of their future clients
beyond the revolving door."'
Other critics of Pitofsky's views believe that the inclusion of non-
economic factors will lead to problems because such factors are hard to
quantify.' However, Pitofsky says these critics place too much faith in
the ability to compute economic effects.
Even if economic theory were clear and consistent, economics provides
no system for reliably determining economic effect .... There is no
reliable way to determine either the pro- or anti-competitive effect of
that merger with anything approaching scientific reliability. As a result,
antitrust enforcement along economic lines already incorporates large
doses of hunch, faith, and intuition.'74
CONCLUSION
Today, there is little question about the enormous impact that mass
media has on society. It controls what Americans see, hear, and consider
166. Time Warner Signs FTC Order to Allow Acquisition of Turner, WALL ST. J., August
15, 1996, at B8.
167. Jube Shriver Jr., White House Weighs Moves to Slow Mergers, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
15, 1995, at D1.
168. Id.
169. Time, supra note 164.
170. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: The Myth of Media Monopolies, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 1996 at A19.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. "How do you measure someone's control in that marketplace?" asks Judith Whalley,
who teaches antitrust law at Georgetown. "Is it the number of stories? The number of
reporters? And when do you start being concerned? Should you have more diversity in
media than you would have in making widgets?" Gruley, supra note 153, at A14.
174. Pitofsky, supra note 75, at 1065.
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important. Because of this direct impact, ownership in mass media becomes
a powerful tool that can easily be abused. With the recent trend towards
high concentration in the ownership of mass media, this power is becoming
more and more centralized into the hands of a few. Critics of this trend are
speaking out and searching for a method to curb the concentration. In his
position as chairman of the FTC, Robert Pitofsky has the ability to use the
antitrust statutes as one avenue.
Under the antitrust doctrine of the past few decades, the media
mergers would be analyzed on a strictly economic basis. The Reagan and
Bush Administrations minimally applied the antitrust laws, and the
reasoning relied solely on economic theory. However, one must realize that
antitrust is a political body of law that has historically undergone changes
through the years. While investigating proposed mergers, Pitofsky can shape
the next trend by not relying solely on economic terms but rather by taking
into account social and political issues. It is important to understand that
economic analysis should by no means be eliminated; rather, social and
political concerns should join economics as the basis for decisions.
There are strong social and political implications if the mass media
continues to become centralized. When the mass media is controlled by
large conglomerates, the goal becomes large profits. Reducing the number
of journalists is one way that mass media will reduce costs but shortchange
its audience. For example, when newspapers decrease their number of
journalists, they are forced to reduce the amount of their local news
coverage and rely more on nationally syndicated columnists. In addition, the
news organizations will focus more on entertainment coverage and less on
the expensive type of "hard news" series. When the mass media is
controlled by large parent companies, their news departments are also less
likely to cover extensively or initiate investigative stories that are detrimen-
tal to their parent companies. In regards to the television and motion picture
industries, the mass media conglomerates now control both production
companies and distribution outlets. This will make it very difficult for an
independent production company to reach a mass audience, and the lack of
competition for distribution opportunities will ultimately reduce the quality
of the final product.
As a scholar, Pitofsky criticized the "hands-off" approach of the past
administrations and strongly supported the idea of taking social and political
concerns into account in the antitrust analysis. As chairman of the FTC,
Pitofsky recognized the potential detrimental effects of Time Warner's
recent acquisition of Turner Broadcasting and initiated an extensive review
before ultimately approving the merger. Pitofsky did require Time
Warner/Turner to reduce its potential 40% ownership of the national cable
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market. However, the FTC's consent order did not address the problem of
Time Warner/Turner owning significant production studios and distribution
outlets. In addition, the new media giant will control CNN, a major force
in national news coverage. Journalists from CNN should prepare for a
reduction in the news staff and pressure from the parent company to
favorably cover its actions and products. Pitofsky's consent order in the
Time Warner/Turner merger did not address many of the problems with a
highly concentrated mass media. The fact that the largest media merger in
history was able to win approval from the FTC shows that Pitofsky has
quickly learned the art of the compromise. However, the recent trend
towards media mergers indicates that he will soon have another opportunity
to review such a merger. When Pitofsky is reviewing the next media
merger, I challenge him to rely on the ideas for the antitrust statutes that he
promoted as a scholar and not fold to the political pressures initiated by big
business.
